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SURVEY COMMENT: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN TAX

LAW IN THE TENTH CIRCUIT
INTRODUCTION
Tax Issues permeate a wide range of legal specialties from estate
planning to changes in a business entity's corporate status. During the
survey period of September 1, 2000 through August 31, 2001, the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals published approximately 22 opinions dealing
with some aspect of tax law.' The Tenth Circuit decided three cases of
particular importance, which this comment analyzes.
The current state of tax law is still evolving. Each circuit court
places its own spin on how to interpret the tax law contained in the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 ("Code"), as amended The first two Tenth
Circuit decisions discussed in this comment establish "new" law, while
the third decision simply reaffirms the past holdings of the Tenth Circuit.
The first case examined in Part I of this comment, addresses dateof-death valuation for determining individual estate tax liability. In Estate of McMorris v. Commissioner,3 a case of first impression, the Tenth
Circuit extended the date-of-death valuation rule announced by the
United States Supreme Court in Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States. The
Court held that "events which occur after a decedent's death may not be
considered in valuing" a § 2053(a)(3)' "claim against the estate" deduction.6
The second case discussed in Part II of this comment, addresses the
deductibility of suspended passive activity losses ("PALs") carried for7
ward to an S corporation. In St. Charles Inv. Co. v. Commissioner,
the
Tenth Circuit held that when a taxpayer corporation changes its status
from a C corporation to an S corporation, it is permissible to carry forward the suspended PALs, incurred during the years it was a C corporation, to the year it became an S corporation, and fully deduct those suspended PALs. 8
The third case considered in Part III of this comment, addresses the
test for determining the deductibility of salaries by a corporation as real.

Author's count based on Westlaw and Lexis searches.
See FRED W. PEEL, JR., UNDERSTANDING THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX: A LAWYER'S
GUIDE TO THE CODE AND ITS PROVISIONS 4(1988).
3.
243 F.3d 1254 (10th Cir. 2001).
4.
279 U.S. 151, 155 (1929) (holding "[t]he estate so far as may be is settled as of the date of
the testator's death").
5.
All statutory references and citations to sections in this comment are to sections of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the "Code"), Title 26 of the United States Code.
6. McMorris, 243 F.3d at 1261 (emphasis added).
7.
232 F.3d 773 (10th Cir. 2000).
8. St. Charles,232 F.3d at 779.
2.
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sonable business expenses. In Eberl's Claim Serv., Inc. v.
Commissioner,9 the Tenth Circuit rejected taxpayer corporation's invitation to adopt an "independent investor test," as recently embraced by
other circuits,"° in favor of stare decisis, reaffirming the use of the
"multi-factor test of reasonable compensation" set forth in its prior decision, Pepsi-ColaBottling Co. v. Commissioner."
I. DATE-OF-DEATH VALUATION FOR DETERMINING INDIVIDUAL
ESTATE TAX LIABILITY

A. Background
In 1916, the federal estate tax system was created in order to generate revenue for use in the United State's anticipated entry into World
War 1.12 Since its adoption,' 3 the federal estate tax system has taxed transfers of property at death, but has allowed deductions for all valid
claims.'4 Included in those allowable deductions is § 2053(a)(3), which
provides for "claims against the estate."' 5 This statute originated in part
from § 202 of the 1916 Act, which declared, "the value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including the value at the
time of his death of all property."' 6 Read in conjunction with the Ways
and Means Committee of the House of Representatives' 1916 Report on
§ 203, which stated, "[i]n determining the value of the net or taxable
estate, deductions for all valid claims against the estate are allowed,' 7 §
2053(a)(3) can be construed to mean that Congress intended a deductible
claim to be fixed or valued at death. 8
Contrary to this statutory interpretation and legislative history, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue ("Commissioner") has historically
9. 249 F.3d 994 (10th Cir. 2001).
10. Eberl's Claim, 249 F.3d at 1003-04.
It. 528 F.2d 176 (10th Cir. 1976).
12. See WFr-CPET Ch. 17: The FederalGift and Estate Taxes, 2001 WL 423593, at *2.
13.
See generally Gary Robbins & Aldona Robbins, The Case for Burying the Estate Tax,
Institute For Policy Innovation, Policy Report #150, at 1-7 (1999), available at www.ipi.org
(discussing a historical overview of U.S. estate taxes and the developments of modem estate tax law
by providing a chronology of legislation, a detailed description, and purpose for the legislation).
14.
See Robert C. Jones, Estate and Income Tax: Claims Against the Estate and Events
Subsequent to Date of Death, 22 UCLA L. REV. 654 n.3 (1975) (explaining that a "valid claim"
includes "funeral expenses; administrative expenses; claims against the estate; mortgages or
indebtedness on property included in the gross estate; certain state and foreign death taxes; casualty
or theft losses incurred during settlement of the estate; public, charitable and religious contributions;
and bequests to the surviving spouse" (citations omitted)).
15.
Craig S. Palmquist, The Estate Tax Deductibility of Unenforced Claims Against a
Decedent's Estate, 11 GONz. L. REV. 707 (1976) (discussing how "claims against the estate" are
"the personal obligations of the decedent existing at the time of death," which arise from a
"contractual arrangement or by operation of law" and are "enforceable under local law").
16. Id. at 709 (quoting Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 202, 39 Stat. 77).
17.
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 922, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1916)).
18.
See id. at 709-10.
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advocated that "a deduction be allowed only for a claim actually paid by
the estate and whose value is determined with accuracy, in light of all
events during the administration of the estate [as opposed to date-ofdeath]."' 9 Treasury Regulation § 20.203 1--1(b) defines "value" to mean
"fair market value" or "the price at which the property would change
hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under
any compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of
relevant facts," 20 however the Code fails to specify how to value property, so "[tihe method of valuation is determined from regulations, IRS
rulings and case law.'
Commissioner's position also conflicts with the United States Supreme Court's adoption of the date-of-death valuation approach12 set
forth in its 1929 unanimous decision, Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States,23
in which decedent's trustee, Ithaca Trust Company, sued the United
States for recovery of taxes that were overpaid.2' Under the terms of decedent's will, testator's wife received the residue of the estate for her life,
and upon her death, the remainder passed in trust to certain charities.25
Initially, testator's estate used mortality tables to calculate wife's life
expectancy and thus arrive at the amount of the charitable deduction allowed for estate tax purposes.26 This valuation method was called into

question when wife died within six months of testator/husband.27 Since
wife "died before reaching her actuarial life expectancy, 28 the United
States argued that the actual date of wife's death applied in valuing the
amount of the charitable deduction, which resulted in Ithaca Trust Company paying a higher estate tax. 29 The Court rejected the United States'
argument and held in favor of Ithaca Trust Company paying a lower estate tax by calculating the charitable deduction "according to the wife's
life expectancy [using mortality tables] as of the date of the testator's
[husband's] death." 30 In reaching this conclusion, the Court explained,
"[tihe estate so far as may be is settled as of the date of the testator's

19.
20.

Id. at 709 (emphasis added).
ELAINE R. FORS ET AL., THE MARYLAND INSTITUTE FOR CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL

IV, at 1 (2000).
21.
Id.
22.
The date-of-death valuation approach fixes the amount of the claims against the estate
deduction at the date of decedent's death. See Palmquist, supra note 15, at 709. See also McMorris,
243 F.3d 1254, 1260 (10th Cir. 2001) (discussing how "events occurring after a decedent's death are
irrelevant in valuing an estate's deduction under section 2053(a)(3)").
23. 279 U.S. 151, 155 (1929) (holding "[tihe estate so far as may be is settled as of the date of
the testator's death").
24. Ithaca Trust, 279 U.S. at 153-54.
25. Id. at 154.
26. Id. at 155.
27. Id.
28.
Robert Don Collier, Survey Article: Federal Taxation, 32 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 823, 827
(2001).
29. See Ithaca Trust, 279 U.S. at 155.
30. McMorris, 243 F.3d at 1259-60 (10th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added).
EDUCATION OF LAWYERS, FEDERAL Gir AND ESTATE TAX RETURNS Ch.
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death."3 ' Today, this pronouncement of the law as articulated by the
Court more than 70 years ago retains its precedential effect, and is
known as the "date-of-death valuation rule. 32
With respect to the Tenth Circuit, the date-of-death valuation topic
was one of first impression for the court when it agreed to hear Estate of
McMorris v. Commissioner.3 The issue for resolution was whether it was
proper in calculating a § 2053(a)(3) deduction to consider post-death
events.3 Since § 2053(a)(3) was silent on the issue and the pertinent tax
regulations provided no clear answer, 5 the Tenth Circuit was forced to
rely on its own discretion in whether to distinguish the holding of Ithaca
Trust or extend it to the facts of Estate of McMorris.
B. Tenth Circuit Case: Estate of McMorris v. Commissioner
1. Facts
Decedent's husband died in 1990, at which time decedent/wife inherited 13.409091 shares of NW Transport Service, Inc. stock 6 The
stock was appraised, at the date of decedent's husband's death, at a value
of $1,726,562.50 per share.37 Shortly thereafter, decedent/wife and NW
Transport entered into a stock redemption agreement for $29.5 million,
or approximately $2.2 million per share.38 Meanwhile, the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue issued a notice to decedent's husband's estate disputing the value of the NW Transport stock.39 In January 1996, a settlement agreement was finalized between decedent husband's estate and the
Commissioner, which increasedthe value of the NW Transport stock to
$2.5 million per share (versus the original appraisal value of
$1,726,562.50 per share in 1990).'o Consequently, the capital gain of
$473,437.50 [$2.2 million per share minus $1,726,562.50 per share] that
decedent/wife had obtained from the stock redemption now resulted in a
loss of $300,000 [$2.5 million per share minus $2.2 million per share],
based on the new $2.5 million per share value set forth by the 1996 settlement agreement. 4' Given this loss realized from the NW Transport
stock redemption, decedent/wife's estate filed an amended federal tax
return requesting a $3,332,443 refund.42 In dispute between dece-

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Ithaca Trust, 279 U.S. at 155.
McMorris, 243 F.3d at 1260.
243 F.3d 1254, 1258 (10th Cir. 2001).
McMorris, 243 F.3d at 1258.
Id. at 1259.
Id. at 1256.
Id.
Id.
Id.
McMorris, 243 F.3d at 1256. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
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dent/wife's estate and the Commissioner was whether the 1996 settlement agreement was relevant in determining the value of the §
2053(a)(3) deduction taken by decedent/wife's estate in its amended federal tax return.4 '3 The Commissioner argued the 1996 settlement nagreement was relevant, while decedent/wife's estate argued it was not.
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit ruled in favor of decedent/wife's estate and extended the date-of-death valuation rule announced by the United States
Supreme Court in Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 45 to the instant case,
by holding that "events which occur after a decedent's death may not be
considered in valuing" a § 2053(a)(3) claim against the estate
deduction.46 Thus, the 1996 settlement agreement was not relevant for
purposes of calculating decedent/wife's estate tax liability.47
In reaching its conclusion, the Tenth Circuit explained that "[s]ound
policy reasons" supported its adoption of the date-of-death valuation
principle. 4 In particular, the court reasoned that the date-of-death valuation principle created a "bright line rule," which would alleviate "the
uncertainty and delay in estate administration which may result if events
occurring months or even years after a decedent's death could be considered in valuing a claim against the estate."4 9 The court further explained
that its "bright line rule" would achieve a longtime "ideal" of the legal
community: bring "more certainty to estate administration., 50 However,
in making this determination, the court attempted to dispel any signs of
inherent favoritism such a bright line rule could create, by stating the rule
could just as easily benefit the Commissioner, rather than the taxpayer/estate depending on "the particular circumstances of each case."5 '
Therefore, the Tenth Circuit created new precedent by recognizing
the date-of-death valuation principle in calculating a § 2053(a)(3) deduction, which practitioners must now consider when valuing an individual
decedent's estate and calculating that estate's tax liability for federal and
state income tax purposes.

43. Id. at 1258.
44. Id.
45. 279 U.S. 151, 155 (1929) (holding "[tihe estate so far as may be is settled as of the date of
the testator's death").
46. McMorris, 243 F.3d at 1261 (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 1263 (emphasis added).
48. Id. at 1261.
49. Id. at 1261-62.
50. Id. at 1262.
51.
Id.
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C. Other Circuits
Despite the United States Supreme Court's unanimous pronouncement in Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 2 the circuits are split on their
extension of the date-of-death valuation rule beyond charitable bequest
deductions.53
1. Fifth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits
In agreement with the Tenth Circuit are the Fifth, Ninth, and the
Eleventh Circuits," which accept the date-of-death valuation approach
and prohibit the consideration of post-death events in valuing claims
against the estate.
a. Fifth Circuit
55 the decedent, prior to her
In Estate of Smith v. Commissioner,
death, was being sued by Exxon Corporation to recoup an overpayment
of royalty proceeds that Exxon had made to decedent and other royalty
owners of oil and gas leases.56 Approximately fifteen months after decedent's death, decedent's estate settled the suit with Exxon for $681,840."
The Commissioner alleged that this settlement set the value of decedent's
estate's § 2053(a)(3) deduction. In a resounding rejection of this argument, the Fifth Circuit held that such post-death facts as the decedent's
estate's settlement with Exxon should not be considered in valuing a §
2053(a)(3) deduction.5 9 The court explained that "the claim generating
the estate tax deduction under § 2053(a)(3) ...must be valued as of the
date of the death of the decedent and thus must [be] appraised on information known or available up to (but not after) that date." 6 In reaching
this conclusion, the court reasoned that when the date-of-death valuation
principle was announced by the United States Supreme Court in Ithaca
Trust Co. v. United States, 6' it was making a determination about the
general nature of the federal estate tax.62 It is a tax imposed on transferred
property that is levied at a discrete time (at death), so it makes sense that

52.
279 U.S. 151, 155 (1929) (holding "[tlhe estate so far as may be is settled as of the date of
the testator's death").
53. See McMorris, 243 F.3d at 1260.
54. See cases cited infra notes 55, 66, 72. See generally 34 A. AM. JUR. 2D Federal Taxation
§ 144,210 (2002) (discussing the Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits' mutual agreement regarding
the broad application of Ithaca Trust in their own jurisdictions).
55.
198 F.3d 515,517 (5th Cit. 1999).
56.
Smith, 198 F.3d at 517.
57.
See id. at 519 (emphasis added).
58.
See id. at 526.
59. See id. at 517-18 (emphasis added).
60.
Id. at 517.
61.
279 U.S. 151, 155 (1929).
62.
See Smith, 198 F.3d at 524. See also Ithaca Trust, 279 U.S. at 155 (concluding that "the
value of the thing to be taxed must be estimated as of the time when the act is done").
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the value of the property transferred should be made at that same time.63
The court further reasoned that since Congress has enacted statutory exceptions to the date-of-death valuation rule, ' it knows how to derogate
from the rule when it wants to, but to date, Congress has "never seen65 fit
to overrule Ithaca Trust legislatively," so the courts should not either.
b. Ninth Circuit
Likewise, in Propstra v. United States,66 decedent's estate consisted
primarily of two parcels of land, which at the time of his death, were
encumbered by liens totaling $202,423.05.6 Approximately three years68
after decedent's death, his estate settled the lien claims for $134,826.23.
The Commissioner alleged decedent's estate was only allowed to deduct
the value of the settlement, or that amount actually paid in discharge of
the liens, which was less than the value of the liens at the time of decedent's death .6 In ruling in favor of decedent's estate, the Ninth Circuit
held that "§ 2053[(a)(3)] precludes the consideration of post-death events
in computing the value of certain and enforceable claims against an estate., 70 In reaching this conclusion, the court was persuaded by the
teachings of Ithaca Trust and the language of Treasury Regulation §
20.2053-4, which "designates 'the time of death' as the critical reference
point" for determining what amounts may be deducted as claims against
an estate.7'
c. Eleventh Circuit
Similarly, in O 'Neal v. United States,72 decedent's estate in seeking
a $1,883,762 estate tax refund claimed it was entitled to a $9,407,226
deduction under § 2053(a)(3) 73 for reimbursement of nine heirs' "transferee gift tax liability" on stock gifts received from decedent,74 prior to
her death. 75 Upon decedent's death, a timely filing of her estate tax return
was made, which was selected for audit by the government who chal76
lenged
§ 2053(a)(3)
A settlement
was was
reached
months the
after
decedent's deduction.
death, but decedent's
estate
heldsome
liablenine
for

63. See Smith, 198 F.3d at 524.
64.
See, e.g., funeral expenses in § 2053(a)(1) and estate administration expenses in §
2053(a)(2). See Smith, 198 F.3d at524.
65. Smith, 198 F.3d at524.
66. 680 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1982).
67. Propstra,680 F.2d at 1250.
68. See id. at 1250 (emphasis added).
69. See id.
70. Id. at 1257.
71. Id.at1255.
72. 258 F.3d 1265 (11thCir.2001).
73. O'Neal, 258 F.3d. at1270.
74. Id. at 1271.
75. Id. at1267.
76. See id at 1268.
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$1,883,762 in estate taxes because its § 2053(a)(3) deduction was reduced from $9,407,226 to $563,314..7 While decedent's estate paid the
increase in taxes, it then sought reimbursement by filing the abovementioned tax refund claim."' The issue for resolution by the Eleventh
Circuit was whether the post-death settlement, which was determined
more than nine months after decedent's death, should influence the value
of the estate's § 2053(a)(3) deduction.7 9 Aligning itself with the Fifth and
Tenth Circuits, the court held in favor of decedent's estate and concluded
that limiting Ithaca Trust to only charitable bequests was erroneous.8O
Instead, the court determined that the better-reasoned and more persuasive approach was to extend Ithaca Trust to cases, such as this one,
which involved § 2053(a)(3) deductions. 8 In such cases, the value of the
§ 2053(a)(3) deduction "must be valued as of the date of the decedent's
death. All events occurring after the decedent's death that alter the value
must be disregarded. 8 2 This included the $563,314 settlement amount
arrived at after decedent's death, which therefore could not be considered in valuing the estate's § 2053(a)(3) deduction.83
2. Second and Eighth Circuits
In contrast, both the Second Circuit ' and the Eighth Circuit85 have
rejected the date-of-death valuation approach and allow post-death
events to be considered in valuing a § 2053(a)(3) deduction.
a. Second Circuit
In Commissioner v. Estate of Shively," decedent/husband, prior to
his death, entered into a separation agreement with his wife, which was
later incorporated into their divorce decree that provided wife $40 a
week in spousal support until her death or remarriage, and if decedent/husband died first, the weekly payments would be a charge upon his
estate. 7 At the time of decedent/husband's death his wife had not remarried, but approximately one year after decedent's death, she did
remarry. Decedent/husband's estate paid wife her weekly support until
the date of her remarriage.8 9 However, when decedent's estate calculated

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

See id.
See id.
See O'Neal, 258 F.3d at 1275.
See id. at 1273 n.25.
See id.
Id. at 1276.
See id. at 1275 (emphasis added).
See case cited infra note 86.
See case cited infra note 97.
276 F.2d 372, 373 (2d Cir. 1960).
Shively, 276 F.2d at 373.
See id. at 373 (emphasis added).
See id.
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its § 2053(a)(3) deduction [formerly § 812(b) deduction], it relied on
wife's unmarried status as of decedent/husband's date of death.'O This
created an expectation of paying $27,058.30 for the duration of wife's
life, based on the $40 a week charge to decedent's estate for her
support.9' Ruling in favor of the Commissioner, the Second Circuit held
that the allowable deduction was limited to $2,079.96, or the amount of
the payments wife had received from the date of decedent/husband's
death to the date of her remarriage.92 The court explained, decedent's
estate may obtain "no greater deduction than the established sum, irrespective of whether this amount is established through events occurring
before or after the decedent's death." 93 In reaching this conclusion, the
court reasoned that to allow otherwise would defeat the purpose of the
deduction, which was "to define that portion of the property of a decedent that is subject to estate tax. '
What is noteworthy about this decision is the attention it brings to
the timing and order of events in an estate administration. As described
by the dissent, the majority relied upon the "fortuitous circumstance" that
the estate tax return was not filed until after wife had remarried." Had the
return been filed before wife's remarriage, or if wife had not remarried
until a few years after the audit, there would have been no grounds for
the Commissioner to challenge the estate's deduction.9
b. Eighth Circuit
Similarly, in Estate of Sachs v. Commissioner,97 the decedent's estate paid income tax on a gift of stock included in the estate at the time of
decedent's death. 98 Four years later, Congress passed the Tax Reform Act
of 1984, which resulted in a full refund of the income tax that that's estate had paid on that gift of stock. 99 Consequently, decedent's estate attempted to use the original income tax it had paid on the gift of stock,
prior to the refund, as a deduction and claim against the estate under §
2053(a)(3)." ° The estate argued that "since the estate's gross value was
diminished by that amount at the time of Sach's death,"'0 ' and the refund
did not occur until after decedent's date of death, it was entitled to the
deduction. 0 2 In ruling in favor of the Commissioner, the Eighth Circuit
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

See id. at 374.
See id. at 375.
See id. at 374.
Shively, 276 F.2d at 375.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
See id. at 376 (emphasis added).
856 F.2d 1158, 1159 (8th Cir. 1988).
Sachs, 856 F.2d at 1159.
See id at 1159.
See id. at 1159-60.
Id. at 1158.
Id. at 1160 (emphasis added).
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held that the estate could not deduct under § 2053(a)(3), "an income-tax
liability which was subsequently forgiven by Congress."'' 3 The court
explained, "an estate loses its § 2053(a)(3) deduction for any claim
against the estate which ceases to exist legally, regardless of whether the
nullification of the claim could have been foreseen."'0 4 In reaching this
conclusion, the court reasoned that Congress intended the § 2053(a)(3)
deduction to accommodate actual claims, those claims already paid or to
be paid, rather than just theoretical claims.' 5 The court further determined that Ithaca Trust was distinguishable and therefore not controlling
on the grounds that the date-of-death valuation principle enunciated by
the Supreme Court was intended to apply only in the narrow context of
charitable bequests, which this case was not. ' 06
D. Analysis
While the Tenth Circuit attributes its holding to a desire to avoid
uncertainty and delay in estate administration by adopting a "bright line
rule,"' 7 one must question whether the advantages of such a strict rule
really outweigh the unfairness that can result' ° when a court is unable to
exercise flexibility. The practicality of the Tenth Circuit's holding is also
questionable with regard to its ability to effectively avoid the uncertainty
and delay that all practitioners filing an estate tax return know: every
return is subject to audit and every estate has the potential of being
dragged out for years before a closing letter is received.' °9 Likewise,
practitioners know that when a deficiency notice is issued, there are typically several different issues, not just one."0 Therefore, "[i]t is unlikely
that a post-death event would be the sole cause of delay."''. When the
Tenth Circuit's holding is viewed in this light, allowing the valuation of
post-death events does not seem to create the hardship the court
suggests.12 As one team of commentators has observed, more fairness
would be achieved if, instead of the current distinction between date-ofdeath and post-death valuation, the cases were distinguished based on
situations where the final adjustments were due to factors out of the estate's control (such as audits or tax law changes) versus factors within the

103.
Id. at 1159 (emphasis added).
104.
Sachs, 856 F.2d at 1161.
105.
See id. at 1160.
106.
See id. at 1162.
107.
McMorris, 243 F.3d at 1261.
108.
See Robert E. Madden & Lisa H.R. Hayes, Estate Tax Deduction Not Altered By PostDeath Events, Rules CA-IO Estate of McMorris, 28 EST. PLAN. 325, comments (2001).
109.
See id.
110. See id.
111.
Id.
112.
See id. (emphasis added).
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estate's control (such as 3choosing to increase liability in order to eliminate future obligations).
In addition, the Tenth Circuit's reassurance that this "bright line
rule" can just as easily benefit the government, as it does the estate,"'
rings hollow in light of the fact that the Commissioner has historically
argued against the date-of-death valuation approach more often than
not. ' Consequently, this unconvincing statement by the court leads one
to conclude the professed fairness of the "bright line rule" is a sham and
in reality the rule weighs in favor of the estate more frequently than the
government."16
To make matters worse, by all indications, the split in the circuits
regarding date-of-death valuation is irreconcilable."' The only way to
resolve the conflict of whether Ithaca Trust should be read as broadly as
the Fifth, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have done, or if instead it
should be construed as narrowly as the Second and Eighth Circuits have
done, is for Congress to enact specific legislation addressing the issue."'
Until that time, practitioners would be well advised to check the precedent of their local circuit court and be prepared to advise a client whether
or not to challenge a valuation of a post-death event depending upon the
approach adopted by their jurisdiction.'
II. DEDUCTIBILITY OF SUSPENDED "PALS" CARRIED FORWARD TO AN S
CORPORATION

A. Background
As a result of Congress's perception that taxpayers were eroding
federal tax revenues by using losses from one activity to offset taxable
income from another activity, the passive activity loss rules were

113.
114.

See id. (emphasis added).
McMorris, 243 F.3d at 1262.

115.

See Palmquist, supra note 15, at 709 (emphasis added).

116. See id.
117. See Estate of Smith v. Comm'r, 198 F.3d 515, 522 (5th Cir. 1999). See also Estate of Van
Home v. Comm'r, 78 T.C. 728, 736-37 (1982) (explaining how "all of the cases in this field dealing
with post-death evidence are not easily reconciled with one another, and at times it is like picking
one's way through a minefield in seeking to find a completely consistent course of decision in this
area") (emphasis added).
118. See, e.g., Robert C. Jones, Estate and Income Tax: Claims Against the Estate and Events
Subsequent to Date of Death, 22 UCLA L. REV. 654, 682 (1975) (encouraging Congress to aid the
executor by "providing a more definitive statement of valuation dates").
119. See Madden & Hayes, supra note 108. Nevertheless, while it is beyond the scope of this
comment, some recourse exists for preparers of estate tax returns by utilizing Code § 2032 or
"protective alternate valuation election (PAVE)," which "allows an executor to use the alternate
values and recalculate a lower tax after the return is filed -- even if the date-of-death values are used
when the return is initially filed." S. Dresden Brunner & Laird A. Lile, PAVE -- A Self-Help
Technique ForEstate Tax Valuation Methods, 75-Oct. FLA. B.J. 44, 44 (2001).
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created.' 20 While the legislative history reveals that several alternative
methods were considered, Congress adopted a system whereby "business
losses would only be permitted to offset nonbusiness income (e.g., wages
and interest) if the taxpayer materially participatedin the business that
generated the loss.' 2' Congress established this "material-participation"
standard in order to "prevent taxpayers from basing their investment decisions primarily upon the tax benefits they would receive.' ' 2 2 Consequently, a passive activity is "any business in which the taxpayer does
not materially participate;" or, in other
2 3 words, the taxpayer is not involved in the activity on a regular basis.
In general, the passive activity restrictions in § 469 "prevent a taxpayer who is not actively involved in a business from deducting losses
from the business as an offset against compensation... or ... portfolio
investments."' 24 However, § 469(c) defines real estate rental activity as a
per se passive activity "without regard to the taxpayer's level of participation in the activity."' Passive activity losses ("PALs") occur when
"the amount, if any, by which the passive activity deductions for the taxable year exceed the passive activity gross income."'26 For example, if a
corporation has total gross income from its real estate rental activities
(passive activities) of $400,000, but it has total deductions from those
same real estate rental activities of $600,000, the corporation will sustain
PALs of $200,000. Typically, under § 469(a) of the Code, PALs are not
deductible.'2 7 However, § 469(b) provides that "PALs can be suspended
and 'carried forward' to the following year" and after application of §
469(b)'s carry-over provision, under § 469(g)(1)(A), any remaining PAL
"shall be treated as a non-passive loss."2'
With respect to the Tenth Circuit, the deductibility of suspended
PALs carried forward to an S corporation was a topic of first impression
for the court when it agreed to hear St. Charles Inv. Co. v.
Commissioner.'29 The issue for resolution was whether it was proper for
the Commissioner to disallow the carry-over of suspended PALs by an S
corporation, which had incurred the PALs while it was a C corporation.'"

120.
(1995).
121.
122.
123.
124.

See NEIL A. RINGQUIST, WORKING WITH THE REVISED PASSIVE ACTIVITY Loss RULES 5

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
PEEL, supra note 2, at 231 (emphasis added).
Id. at 230 (emphasis added).

§ 603 (1995).
Id. at § 1202 (emphasis added).
See id at § 1207.1.
St. Charles Inv. Co. v. Comm'r, 232 F.3d 773, 774 (10th Cir. 2000).
St. Charles, 232 F.3d at 775.
See id. See generally I. RICHARD GERSHON, A STUDENT'S GUIDE To THE INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE 6-7 (4th ed. 1999) (discussing the Code's different corporate tax treatments and
explaining how "S" corporations and "C" corporations received their names as a result of the Code
125.

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

RICHARD M. LIPTON ET AL., PASSIVE ACTIVITY LOSSES
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Since this was an issue undecided by any other circuit, the Tenth Circuit
relied on its own discretion when interpreting the congressional intent
and statutory language of the provisions in question.
B. Tenth Circuit Case: St. CharlesInv. Co. v. Commissioner13'
1. Facts
From 1988 to 1990, St. Charles operated as a closely held C corporation engaged in real estate rental activities (i.e., "passive activities").'
In 1991, St. Charles changed its tax status to an S corporation133 and sold
some of its rental properties, which had suspended PALs associated with
them for the years when St. Charles operated as a C corporation.' ,4 St.
Charles then identified those suspended PALs, totaling $6,038,001, on its
1991 tax return and claimed them as deductions as authorized by §
469(g)(1)(A).' 35 In 1996, the Commissioner issued a notice of adjustment
disallowing St. Charles' use of its suspended PALs based on §
1371(b)(1), which "prohibits an S corporation from carrying any 'carryforward' from a year in which the corporation was a C corporation to a
year in which the corporation is an S corporation."'' 36 In dispute was the
the two carry-over provisions of § 469(b) and §
conflict between
37
137 1(b)(1).1
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit ruled in favor of St. Charles and held that when a
taxpayer corporation changes its status from a C corporation to an S corporation, it is permissible to carry forward the suspended PALs, incurred
during the years it was a C corporation, to the year it became an S corporation, and fully deduct those suspended PALs.' 3s The court explained by
implementing the rules of statutory construction, the "except as otherwise provided" language of § 469(b) 39 prevented any exceptions not

setting forth the requirements for each type of corporation in Subchapter S and Subchapter C,
respectively).
131.
232 F.3d 773 (10th Cir. 2000).
132. See St. Charles,232 F.3d at 774.
133. The Code treats such corporations in a special fashion in that "[t]he income or loss to an S
corporation flows through to the shareholders" providing "the advantages of the corporate form
without double taxation." PETER C. KOSTANT, BusINESS ORGANIZATIONS: PRACTICAL
APPLICATIONS OF THE LAW 86 (1996). In contrast, a C corporation is taxed on its profits and the
shareholders are taxed on any corporate dividends they receive, which results in double taxation. See
id. at 85.
134. See St. Charles,232 F.3d at 774.
135. See id.
136. Id. at 775.
137. See id. at 776.
138. See id. at 779.
Specifically, § 469(b) states: "Except as otherwise provided in this section, any loss or
139.
credit from an activity which is disallowed under subsection (a) shall be treated as a deduction or
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expressly stated in § 469(b) from applying, which included §
1371(b)(1)'s restrictions' on carry forwards from a C year to an S
year.' 4' In reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned that Congress intended § 469(b) to be interpreted in this way because the plain language
of § 469(f)(2)4 2 allowed "the application of § 469 to a corporation's
PALs even after it ceases to be a closely held C corporation.' ' 43 The
court further determined that while its decision created a "windfall in
favor of the shareholders of St. Charles, effectively allowing one taxpayer (the shareholder) to offset his income with the losses of a different
taxpayer (the corporation)," the result was warranted because the statutory text of § 469 unequivocally supported it.'"
C. Other Circuits
As of the survey period (September45 1, 2000 - August 31, 2001), no
other circuits had considered this issue.
D. Analysis
Unlike McMorris, where the Tenth Circuit denied that its extension
of date-of-death valuation would create unfairness by always favoring
the taxpayer/estate,'" in St. Charles, the Tenth Circuit openly admitted
that its holding would create a windfall for the taxpayer. 47 Yet, the Tenth
Circuit justified the windfall in St. Charles as valid because there existed
"unequivocal support for such a result in the statutory text.' 48 While one
can understand how the "unequivocal support" standard provides the
minimum floor for which the court must comply, it is less clear why the
court is unwilling to exercise its powers of equity to recalibrate the windfall that exists. One can speculate that more was driving the court than
just strict compliance with the rules of statutory construction, such as
common sense. A common sense evaluation of the case points out that
St. Charles was still the same company, engaged in the same activities in

credit allocable to such activity in the next taxable year." 26 U.S.C. § 469(b) (2001) (emphasis
added).
140.
In particular, § 1371(b)(1) provides that "[n]o carryforward, and no carryback, arising for
a taxable year for which a corporation is a C corporation may be carried to a taxable year for which
such corporation is an S corporation." 26 U.S.C. § 1371(b)(1) (2001).
141.
See St. Charles, 232 F.3d at 775, 777 (emphasis added).
142.
Specifically, § 469(f)(2) states: "If a taxpayer ceases for any taxable year to be a closely
held C corporation ...this section shall continue to apply to losses... to which this section applied
for any preceding taxable year in the same manner as if such taxpayer continued to be a closely held
C corporation." St. Charles, 232 F.3d at 778 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 469(f)(2) (2001)).
143. St. Charles, 232 F.3d at 778 (emphasis added).
144. Id. at 779.
145. See id. at 775.
146. See supra text accompanying note 51.
147. See St. Charles, 232 F.3d at 779.
148. Id.
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1991 as it was in 1988, 49 and it had merely elected for different tax
treatment under a different chapter of the Code: subchapter S, rather than
subchapter C of chapter 1.'5" Viewed in this light, the result achieved by
the court in St. Charles is both reasonable and distinguishable from
McMorris, where the court was dealing with a situation that was not the
same, because the settlement agreement was executed after the decedent's death, by parties other than the decedent himself.
III. TEST FOR DETERMINING THE DEDUCTIBILITY OF SALARIES BY A
CORPORATION AS REASONABLE BUSINESS EXPENSES

A. Background
Pursuant to § 162(a)(1), a taxpayer corporation is authorized to deduct a "reasonable allowance for salaries and other compensation" 5 ' of
its employees as an "ordinary and necessary business expense.' ' 52 However, several "suspect situations" exist in which the Commissioner is
more likely to challenge an employee's salary as excessive, 1 3 such as
when "the payor and payee are related parties"' or the related taxpayers'
"economic interests are essentially identical" ,-5
and income-shifting is
occurring, as in closely held corporations.' 56 It is within this context of
closely held corporations that the rationale for the reasonableness limitation is particularly evident.'57 Absent the reasonableness limitation, income-shifting would occur in the form of the employer-corporation
paying an excessive salary to its controlling shareholder (who also serves
as the corporation's executive so that "the corporation is practically a
one-person company"), 8 which is deductible to the employercorporation, in lieu of paying a dividend to the shareholder-executive,
which is not deductible to the employer-corporation.'59 As a result, the
corporation shifts the income that was due and owing to the shareholderexecutive away from itself by not paying a dividend and reduces its own
tax liability by the dollar-amount of the shareholder-executive's compen-

149.
150.
151.

See id at 774.
See PEEL, supra note 2, at 186.
MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: A LAW STUDENT'S GUIDE TO

THE LEADING CASES AND CONCEPTS 117

(3d ed. 1982).

DANIEL Q. POSIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS WITH DIAGRAMS FOR
EASY UNDERSTANDING OF THE LEADING CASES AND CONCEPTS I 6.03(2)(a) (4th ed. 1998).
153.
DANtEL Q. POSIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS AND BASIC CONCEPTS
IN THE TAXATION OF ALL ENTITIES 321 (Student ed. 1983).

152.

154.
For example, "corporation and shareholder or as members of the same family--so that the
,overpayment' actually entails no economic loss to the employer." CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 151, at
117.
155. Id. at 118.
156. See id
157. See id.
158.
TIMOTHY P. BJUR & DENNIS JENSEN, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 2129.10 (1995).

159.

See CHIRELSTEIN,

supra note 151, at 118.
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sation. '6° Of course, since the shareholder-executive's "economic interests are essentially identical" to the closely held corporation' S6I (i.e., pay
as little tax to the Commissioner as possible by reducing "their total tax
burden"), '62 without the reasonableness limitation, the choice to pay an
excessive salary rather than a dividend16 would result in great revenue
losses to the Commissioner.
Thus, in the event the Commissioner is successful in proving an
executive's salary is excessive, the executive can still get paid, however
the salary will be "disallowed" and "recharacterized as a dividend,"
which is taxable to the executive as income arising from his role as
shareholder, but is not deductible by the corporation as a reasonable
business expense 6 Throughout the dispute, the burden of proof remains
with the taxpayer asserting the compensation is "reasonable.' 65
With regard to federal circuit court law on this topic of reasonable
compensation, there is a vast body of established law.' 66 However, as the
topic relates to the Tenth Circuit, one specific approach, the "multi-factor
test," was adopted in 1976 in Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v.
Commissioner,67 and it provides nine factors to consider when determining whether a salary is "reasonable. ' ' 68 In Eberl's Claim Serv., Inc. v.
Commissioner,69 the Tenth Circuit was confronted with the decision of
whether to continue its use of the "multi-factor test" or adopt70 the "independent investor test," as recently embraced by other circuits.
B. Tenth Circuit Case: Eberl's Claim Serv., Inc. v. Commissioner
1. Facts
Taxpayer corporation, a closely held Colorado claims adjusting
company, provided independent claims adjuster's services to insurance
companies following major disasters.' Eberl was the corporation's
founder, president, sole shareholder and claims adjuster. 72 While a 1988
employment agreement existed between Eberl and taxpayer corporation,
Eberl's salary or a formula for its computation was not specified.'73 A
160.
161.
162.

See id.
Id.

163.

POSIN, supra note 153, at 365.
See CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 151, at 119.

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
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171.
172.
173.

Id.
See Kurzet v. Comm'r, 222 F.3d 830, 834 (10th Cir. 2000).
See discussion infra Part In.C.
528 F.2d 176, 179 (10th Cir. 1976).
Eberl's Claim, 249 F.3d at 999.
249 F.3d 994 (10th Cir. 2001).
Eberl's Claim, 249 F.3d at 1003.
See id. at 996.
See id.
See id. (emphasis added).
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1992 amendment to the agreement also did not fix the amount of Eberl's
compensation, but did loosely tie his salary to gross revenues.'7 The only
other employees receiving regular salaries were part-time clerical staff.'75
At no time during taxpayer corporation's existence were dividends
.paid.'76 Taxpayer corporation's gross receipts typically ranged from $2
million to $4 million, but sharp inclines were recorded in 1992
($20,438,803) and 1993 ($9,168,585) based on the large number of major catastrophes in those years. 77 Consequently, Eberl's salary was significantly higher in those years: $4,340,000 for 1992 and $2,080,000 for
1993 (versus $190,000 to $608,000 in prior years). 78 When taxpayer
corporation attempted to claim Eberl's salary as a deductible business
objected to Eberl's 1992 and 1993 salaries as
expense, the' Commissioner
"excessive."' 79 The issue before the Tenth Circuit was whether Eberl's
salaries in 1992 and 1993 were "reasonable," or whether they in fact
constituted disguised dividend payments that should have been taxed.'s
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit ruled in favor of the Commissioner and rejected
taxpayer corporation's invitation to adopt an "independent investor test,"
as recently embraced by other circuits, 8 ' in favor of stare decisis by reaffirming the use of the "multi-factor test of reasonable compensation" set
forth in its prior decision, Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. Commissioner.'
The court explained that a compensation plan is considered "reasonable"
if it is a result of a "longstanding, consistently applied plan negotiated at
arm's length.'5' 18 Here, it was not. No written documentation that a formula for calculating Eberl's salary existed" and even if such formula
had existed, it was not negotiated at arm's length since Eberl was both
controlling shareholder and employee.'85 Moreover, Eberl's salary was
not determined until the end of each year, once taxpayer corporation's
expenses were known, which enabled Eberl to receive virtually all of the
corporation's net profits as compensation (not taxable) in lieu of paying a
dividend (taxable) 6 Under the totality of these circumstances, the court
concluded Eberl's salary was unreasonable and "a disguise for nondeductible profit distributions,"'' 87 on which taxpayer corporation had a
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
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at 996-97 (emphasis added).
See id.
See id. at 997.
See Eberl's Claim, 249 F.3d at 997.
See ia
See id
Id. at 996.
See id.
See id at 1003-04.
528 F.2d 176 (10th Cir. 1976).
Eberl's Claim, 249 F.3d at 1000.
See id at 1000 n.2.
See id.at 1000.
See id.
Id.
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duty to pay taxes.8 In reaching this conclusion, the court acknowledged
that while the "independent investor test"'8 9 had the potential to provide a
simpler and more purposive solution than the multi-factor approach, it
was bound, absent en banc rehearing, to adhere to the totality of the circumstances/multi-factor approach adopted in Pepsi-ColaBottling.'9°
C. Other Circuits
Among the other circuits which have agreed with the Tenth Circuit
that a multi-factor test is best to use in determining the reasonableness of
salaries, there is variation in the actual number of factors that must be92
satisfied.' 9' For example, the Tenth Circuit's Pepsi-Cola Bottling case'
lists nine factors,'93 as does the Sixth Circuit, as set forth in Mayson Mfg.
Co. v. Commissioner,'" but the Fifth Circuit applies only eight factors, as
95 Despite
listed in Owensby & Kritikos, Inc. v. Commissioner.'
these
quantitative discrepancies in the factors employed by the above circuits
to determine reasonableness of salary, in the end, they all employ a form
of balancing the totality of the circumstances, rather than focusing on just
one dispositive issue.
In contrast, of those circuits that have adopted the "independent
investor test,"' 96 only the Seventh Circuit in Exacto Spring Corp. v.

188. See id. at 1002.
189.
Specifically, the independent investor test asks, "whether an inactive, independent
investor would be willing to compensate the employee as he was compensated." Eberl's Claim 249
F.3d at 1003 (quoting Elliotts, Inc. v. Comm'r, 716 F.2d 1241, 1245 (9th Cir. 1983)).
190.
Eberl's Claim, 249 F.3d at 1003-04.
191.
See id. at 999.
192.
Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. Commissioner, 528 F.2d 176, 179 (10th Cir. 1976). Those nine
factors are:
(1) [tjhe employee's qualifications; (2) [tjhe nature, extent and scope of the employee's work; (3)
[t]he size and complexities of the business; (4) [a] comparison of salaries paid with the gross income
and the net income; (5) [t]he prevailing general economic conditions; (6) [a] comparison of salaries
with distributions to stockholders; (7) [t]he prevailing rates of compensation for comparable
positions in comparable concerns; (8) [t]he salary policy of the taxpayer as to all employees; [and]
(9) [in the case of small corporations with a limited number of officers the amount of compensation
paid to the particular employee in previous years.
Id. at 179.
193. See Eberl's Claim, 249 F.3d at 999.
194.
178 F.2d 115, 119 (6th Cir. 1949) (employing identical factors as the 10th Circuit in
Pepsi-ColaBottling Co.).
195.
819 F.2d 1315, 1323 (5th Cir. 1987) (applying the same factors as the 6th Circuit in
Mayson Mfg. Co., except for factor (9), which was not relevant, "[b]ecause the taxpayers have not
argued that the payments in the years at issue were made in recompense for underpayments in
previous years").
196.
See, e.g., Dexsil Corp. v. Comm'r, 147 F.3d 96, 100-201 (2d Cir. 1998) (explaining how
the independent investor test "is not a separate autonomous factor; rather, it provides a lens through
which the entire analysis should be viewed"); Elliotts, Inc. v. Comm'r, 716 F.2d 1241, 1245 (9th Cir.
1983) (applying a multi-factor test "from the perspective of an independent investor") and Rapco,
Inc. v. Comm'r, 85 F.3d 950, 954-55 (2d Cir. 1996) (same). See also Eberl's Claim. 249 F.3d at
1003.
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Commissioner'9'has completely rejected the multi-factor test.'9 The Seventh Circuit in adopting the "independent investor test" held that the
CEO's "'exorbitant' salary (as it might appear to a judge or other modestly paid official)" was "presumptively reasonable" because the investors in the company were "obtaining a far higher return than they had any
reason to expect."' 99 The court explained this result was justified, hence
the qualifying language "presumptively reasonable," as long as the
higher rate of return being generated was due to the CEO's own exertions, and not someone else' S.* In reaching this conclusion, the court
reasoned that by tying salary to performance, executive retention was
encouraged because "killing the goose that lays the golden egg ' 20' would
not be good business for the company or its investors. In addressing the
inadequacies associated with" the multi-factor test, the court explained
that "judges are not competent to decide what business executives are
worth," 20 2 and yet that is exactly what the multi-factor test requires judges
to do. In particular, the court criticized the lack of directive provided by
the multi-factor test in that "[n]o indication is given of how the factors
are to be weighed in the event they don't all line up on one side." 203 The
court explained that such an imbalance is resolved by a judge using his
own discretion and his "own ideas of what jobs are comparable, what
relation an employee's salary should bear to the corporation's net earnings, what types of business should pay abnormally high (or low) salaries, and so forth. '24 The court further explained that since judges are
neither trained nor experienced in such industry-specific matters, and the
multi-factor "test cannot itself determine the outcome of a dispute because of its nondirective character," the results are arbitrary. 2° As a result, corporations have no uniform guidance from the law when it comes
to determining executive compensation, and this lack of predictability
206
creates expensive and unavoidable legal risks for the corporation. As a
replacement for the "redundant, incomplete, and unclear" 20 7 multi-factor
test, the court proposed that the "independent investor test" provided a
more logical and fair approach to determining executive salaries by, in
essence, allowing the supply and demand needs of the market dictate,
like other prices, what was reasonable.00 This supply and demand approach is reflected in whether the corporation, through the efforts of its
executives surpasses the investors' expectations of return on their in197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

196 F.3d 833, 838 (7th Cir. 1999).
See Eberl's Claim, 249 F.3d at 1004 n.6.
Exacto Spring, 196 F.3d at 839.
Id.
Id. at 838.
Id.
Id. at 835.
Id.
Exacto Spring, 196 F.3d at 839.
See id.
Id. (quoting Palmer v. City of Chicago, 806 F.2d 1316, 1318 (7th Cir. 1986)).
See id. at 836, 838.
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vestment in the corporation. 2°9 When an executive achieves a higher rate
of return than investors expect, he can command a greater salary, which
in turn, is an incentive for the executive to stay with the corporation and
continue to make it profitable for the investors, allowing everyone to
win. 210
D. Analysis
In McMorris, the Tenth Circuit expressly announced favoritism for
the date-of-death valuation method because it offered all of the advantages of a "bright line rule." 2 ' Yet, when the Tenth Circuit was presented
with the opportunity to adopt the "independent investor test" in Eberl's
Claim, which is clearly more of a "bright line rule" than the multi-factor
test, the court declined to do so.212 While this decision is attributable to
the court's desire to conform to the principle of stare decisis, there are
two hints that the court is leaving the door open for future consideration
of the "independent investor test." First, the Tenth Circuit's remark that
"absent en banc rehearing" it must conform with its prior precedent in
Pepsi-Cola Bottling, suggests the inclusion of such a statement means
the court may consider changing to the "independent investor test" if
given the opportunity for an en banc rehearing. t 3 Second, and perhaps
providing more convincing evidence is the court's acknowledgement that
the "independent investor test is an attractive solution. 214 For the numerous reasons articulated by Chief Judge Posner in Exacto Spring Corp. v.
Commissioner,2 5 the more simplified "independent investor test" is a
convincing approach for determining the reasonableness of salaries by
eliminating the arbitrary and unpredictable decisions arising from a
court's free exercise of judicial discretion in an area it has no experience:
the private, for-profit, corporate world. 1 6
CONCLUSION

In general, tax law is substantially driven by statutes and IRS regulations, which limit courts in their interpretations. Typically, the rules for
statutory construction are strictly complied with leaving little room for
courts to exercise flexibility or make changes in the law without receiving criticism. Thus, it is no surprise that while the Tenth Circuit was
willing over the past survey period of September 1, 2000 through August
31, 2001, to adopt some new tax law in cases of first impression: that is,
the date-of-death valuation in McMorris for determining individual estate
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

See id. at 838-39.
See id. at 838.
See supra text accompanying notes 50-51.
See Eberl's Claim, 249 F.3d at 1003.
Id.
Id. at 1003.
196 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 1999). See supratext accompanying notes 198-211.
See supra text accompanying notes 198-211.
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tax liability; and the deductibility of suspended passive activity losses
("PALs") carried forward to an S corporation in St. Charles; the Tenth
Circuit was less willing to depart from the principle of stare decisis and
make changes to past holdings. For example, the Tenth Circuit's refusal
in Eberl's Claim to join the bandwagon established by other circuits in
adopting the "independent investor test," as a "new" test for determining
the reasonableness of executive salaries.
Therefore, attorneys practicing within the Tenth Circuit's jurisdiction would be well advised to embrace the court's past decisions and not
expect a change in tax law, unless the case presents a topic of first impression and the Tenth Circuit is required to rely on its own discretion,
rather than just rules of statutory construction, to arrive at its decision.
Darby Hildreth

